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This is an appeal from convictions for unlawful distribution of a controlled 
substance and unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, both 
secon z-vjt reiomes. ihis (Jouri hro jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 78-2a-
3(2)(e ; ' 1 ' ^ 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for 
new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct where the trial court sustained 
defendant's objection at trial and immediately gave a curative instruction, 
the jury's written instructions addressed the issue, and evidence of 
defendant's guilt was overwhelming? 
' " "mi v lien reviewing , .t's denial of a motion for a new trial, [this Court] w ill 
not reverse absent a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court.'" State v. ColwelU 2000 
..instate \. Marnti-h. u ; , . .<-..:. J -t»«'»(Utah 1998)). 
When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, "because 
the trial court is in the best position to determine the impact of a statement upon the 
proceedings, its rulings . . . will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion." State v. 
Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 927 (Utah App. 1998); see also State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 
60, 513 P.2d 422,426 (1973)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions, statutes or rules are dispositive of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 31, 1998, defendant was charged with one count of unlawful distribution 
of cocaine and one count of unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to distribute (R. 
13-15). After a two-day trial, the jury found defendant guilty on both counts (R. 130-31; 
176:223). Defendant then filed a motion for new trial, which was denied (R. 140-41; 
157). Defendant timely appealed (R. 159). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 22, 1998, at about 2:00 p.m., Detectives Jason T. Johnson and Shawn 
Roberts were participating in an undercover drug operation in the vicinity of Pioneer Park 
in Salt Lake City (175:6-7). As the two detectives drove around Pioneer Park in an 
unmarked police car, Detective Roberts waved a twenty-dollar bill out the window to 
signal that he was interested in buying drugs (R. 175:8-10). A black male, later identified 
as LaVon Brown, responded to Detective Roberts' gesture and motioned for the 
2 
detectives to come over (R 175:10, 12), Upon approaching Brown, Detective Johnson 
a 4 n l i fBr i iv i I I i i hccwi. ;>lia,i ii min.11 In MH JII IL ai K! duoon" J l . 
175:12,53). " " ' 
B-in INMI signaled for the detectives to pull into a parking spot, but the detectives 
said they wanted to circle the block first and that they'd be right back (R. 1 7 5 : 1 ^ While 
mi ii II II mi in i > 11 in I fllllii l i HI ( i n i l l I ii III in i ml IIII in i (mi (ml I i n ( I d a H i 1 i ' i 'in I i i mi I mi III mi i i ] iiiiii i l l 
down" team that the deal was going down (R. 175:13) *hen returned to Brown and 
recommenced the deal (R. 175:15, 54). After assuring himself that the detectives w ere 
not cops, Brown asked the detectives to wait and then walked toward another black male, 
defendant, w 1 i ;: • > as stai idii ig S' oi i le t i \ • eiilh - feet; s 
wearing an overcoat and a unique brimmed hat (R. 175:16-17, 55, 60). 
A
 s the tw o detectives watched, defendant removed a bag about the size of a golf 
irom the frc... ... nispants (K 1 J IK, "O, 60). I k'tendanl, a big man about six feet 
three inche- 1 I in kii ' iiiiiiiiiiill i'.i nil In I 
55, 60). During the entire exchange, which lasted one or two minutes, defendant tried to 
intimidate the detectives; on numerous occasions, defendant looked directly at the 
detcilints MII .IIIIII lllliii ulnli lni.il m i Ilium Ilium! al iJelendajil s t a t i (R I  I ,'li J J) 
g r 0 W I 1 r e t u m e ( j t 0 1 ^ detectives" car, delivered defendant's pmd I I line . 
detectives, and accepted Detective Roberts' money (R. 175:19). As the detectives left, 
they signaled!the take-down team to arrest the two dealers (P. 175:24, 57). 
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The take-down team stopped defendant and Brown about one block away (R. 
175:25-27, 57). Detectives Johnson and Roberts soon joined the team and positively 
identified defendant and Brown as those who had just completed the drug deal (R. 
175:25-27, 57). Detective Roberts then conducted a search of defendant's person and 
located a distribution quantity of drugs hanging from a string down the front of 
defendant's pants (R. 175:27-38, 58). All detectives who witnessed the search noticed a 
distinctive scar on defendant's stomach (R. 175:27-28, 36-38, 91, 119; R. 176:197-98). 
After several moments, defendant offered to help the detectives and take-down 
team locate bigger suppliers (R. 175:40). Defendant's offer was accepted and four of the 
detectives spent the next one-and-a-half to two hours riding, walking, observing, and 
talking with defendant as he unsuccessfully tried to find suppliers (R. 175:40-42; 81). 
After agreeing to contact Detective Johnson when he located a supplier, defendant was 
released (R. 175: 40-43). Except for a few telephone messages the next month, defendant 
was not heard from again (R. 175:43, 68). 
On July 31, 1998, an information was filed charging defendant with one count of 
unlawful distribution of cocaine and one count of unlawful possession of cocaine with 
intent to distribute (R. 13-15). Defendant was arrested the following November (R. 
175:73; 176:175-76). 
The trial. At defendant's trial, four police detectives testified: Detectives 
Johnson and Roberts, who actually participated in the drug transaction, and Detectives 
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Jason Mazuran and Darren Carr, who were members of the take-down team that stopped 
defendant after the transaction had been completed. Each of them explained why they 
were absolutely sure that defendant was the person who had provided Brown with the 
drugs that day. 
Detective Johnson explained first that it was daylight during the drug transaction, 
that defendant was only about twenty to thirty feet away at the time, and that defendant 
repeatedly looked directly at Detective Johnson during the transaction, giving the 
detective a clear look at defendant's face (R. 175:20-22). 
In addition, Detective Johnson was present when Detective Roberts conducted the 
search of defendant and remembered having a conversation with defendant when he saw 
defendant's scar (R. 175:27-28, 36-38). He also received a copy of defendant's South 
Carolina identification at the time (R. 175:39, 50). 
Finally, Detective Johnson was one of the detectives that stayed with defendant 
that afternoon as defendant tried to locate suppliers (R. 175:39, 42, 50). Detective 
Johnson concluded: "I wouldn't have released him if I wouldn't have remembered him" 
(R. 175:82). The detective had no doubt that defendant was the second person involved 
in the drug sale on May 22nd (R. 175:22). 
Detective Roberts testified that defendant also had looked directly at him during 
the drug transaction and that Detective Roberts was thus able to get a clear look at 
defendant's face (R. 175:116). In addition, it was Detective Roberts who conducted the 
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search of defendant shortly after he was detained (R. 175:117, 119). The fact that 
Detective Roberts had a scar similar to defendant's stuck in the detective's mind (R. 
175:117,119). 
Furthermore, Detective Roberts was the detective who sat next to defendant that 
afternoon while defendant tried to locate suppliers (R. 175:120-21). Throughout that 
period, Detective Roberts was able to observe defendant clearly, as well as hear his 
unique voice (R. 175:120-21). 
Finally, Detective Roberts explained that he remembered the events of May 22nd 
very well because it was his first hand-to-hand drug transaction, and he was nervous (R. 
175:131). Like Detective Johnson, Detective Roberts had no doubt that defendant had 
participated in the drug sale on May 22nd (R. 175:116). 
Detective Jason Mazuran was a member of the take-down team that stopped 
defendant after the drug transaction had been completed (R. 175:89). During the stop, 
Detective Mazuran was able to get a good look at defendant, as well as his scar (R. 
175:91-92). 
Detective Mazuran was also one of the detectives that stayed with defendant after 
the stop (R. 175:95). It was he who personally accompanied defendant to the homes at 
which the alleged suppliers were located (R. 175:94). Detective Mazuran thus looked at 
defendant "right in the face numbers of times that day, talked to him, walked with him, 
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spent time with him" (R. 175:105). As with the others, Detective Mazuran had no doubt 
it was defendant with whom he had worked that day (R. 175:95). 
Finally, Detective Carr was another member of the take-down team that stopped 
defendant after the drug transaction (R. 176:194-95). Detective Carr recalled defendant, 
not only because of the scar on his stomach, but also because defendant had made a 
comment about the detective's height during the stop (R. 176:197-98). Detective Carr 
also accompanied defendant on his search for suppliers that day. He, like Detectives 
Johnson, Roberts, and Mazuran before him, had no doubt that defendant was the same 
person whom he had stopped on May 22nd (R. 176:199). 
Two people - defendant and his friend Rudolph Martin - testified on defendant's 
behalf. Defendant testified that after doing chores the morning of Friday, May 22, he 
began an eleven-mile walk to attend a three-day family barbeque that began about noon 
that day and ended Sunday, May 24 (even though Monday was Memorial Day) (R. 
176:168-73). He had no personal recollection of the date of the cookout until a friend 
asked "'Well, I thought you had a cookout on that weekend'" (P. 176:173). Thus, he was 
not at Pioneer Park on May 22 and did not participate in any drug deal (R. 176:177). 
Defendant also testified that he had never heard of LaVon Brown-the other 
suspect-prior to this criminal proceeding (R. 176:189). As for his South Carolina 
identification card, defendant testified that it had been stolen from his wallet while his car 
was in for repairs when he first moved to Utah (R. 176:174-75). 
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Finally, defendant testified that he had known witness Rudy Martin-who allegedly 
finally picked defendant up about two miles away from the picnic-for approximately 
three or four years and that he had at no time talked with Martin about the case (R. 
176:180-82, 186-87). 
Rudy Martin testified that he had only known defendamt for about one year and 
that he had in fact talked with defendant about the case prior to trial (R. 176:203). Martin 
asserted that he had picked defendant up on May 22nd about two miles away from the 
picnic at about 12:30 p.m. on his way back from a beer run and that there were thirty to 
forty people at the picnic (R. 176:204-06, 220). Martin claimed he did not see defendant 
leave except to get a table from a neighbor (R. 176:204-06, 220). Martin admitted that he 
had two felony convictions involving dishonest conduct (R. 176:204-06, 220). 
After deliberation, the jury found defendant guilty as charged (R. 176:223). 
Motion in limine and alleged prosecutorial misconduct. Prior to trial, 
defendant filed a motion in limine to suppress evidence of prior convictions and prior bad 
acts (R. 61-62). During trial but outside the presence of the jury, the trial court heard 
argument on that motion (R. 175:33-36; Addendum A). The court then ruled that it was 
not going to let the State bring up anything concerning defendant's prior misdemeanor 
charges (R. 175:35; Addendum A). Concerning defendant's prior conviction for 
aggravated assault, the court ruled: "Well, it would only be admissible, I guess, if he gets 
8 
up there and says he's never been convicted of a felony or something like that" (R. 
175:35; Addendum A). 
Defendant was the fifth of seven witnesses to testily at trial. During cross-
examination of defendant by the prosecutor, the following discussion took place: 
Q [Prosecutor]: So in order for your story to be true, that 
would mean that Detective Johnson had 
to take the stand and lie, isn't it? 
[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, I object. A witness can not 
[Defendant]: I can answer that question. 
[Defense counsel]: A witness cannot comment on another 
witness' credibility. The case law is 
clear on that. 
The Court: Sustained, that's an improper question. 
Q [Prosecutor]: Mr. Zinnerman, have you previously 
been convicted of a felony? 
[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, I would object and ask to 
approach at this time. 
(Discussion at the bench off the record) 
The Court: Ladies and gentlemen, that's an improper 
question to be asked in this court and 
he's not going to be allowed to ask that 
question so disregard the question. 
[Prosecutor]: No further questions. 
The Court: Anything further of this witness? 
[Defense counsel]: Yes, just brief. 
(R. 176:189-90; Addendum B). The prosecutor made no further reference to defendant's 
possible criminal past.1 
Neither opening nor closing arguments were transcribed, indicating that defendant 
found none of the statements therein offensive. 
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In its written jury instructions, the trial court instructed the jury that "[a]ll 
presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a defendant 
is presumed innocent until he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubf (R. 110, Jury 
Instruction 16). In addition, Jury Instruction 29 provided: 
At times throughout the trial the Court has been called 
upon to determine whether offered evidence might properly 
be admitted. You are not to be concerned with the reasons for 
such rulings and are not to draw any inferences from them. 
Whether offered evidence is admissible is purely a question of 
law. In admitting evidence to which an objection is made, the 
Court does not determine what weight should be given such 
evidence, nor does it pass on the credibility of the witness. 
You are not to consider evidence offered but not admitted, nor 
any evidence stricken out by the Court. As to any question to 
which an objection was sustained, you must not conjecture as 
to what the answer might have been or as to the reason for the 
objection. 
(R. 123; Addendum C). 
After his convictions, defendant filed a motion for new trial (R. 140-41). At the 
hearing on defendant's motion, defendant argued that the "mere mention" by the 
prosecutor of the possibility that defendant had a prior criminal record was prejudicial 
error, especially when it immediately followed another inappropriate question by the 
prosecutor (R. 177:2-4; Addendum D). Defendant also argued that the prosecutor's 
question was especially harmful here because the prosecutor, at the same time he asked 
defendant about felony convictions, held up a docket, implying that the docket "further 
10 
substantiated the question that there must be something that the prosecutor is looking at" 
(R. 177:3; Addendum D). 
The prosecutor challenged defendant's allegations, arguing both that his question 
concerning defendant's criminal past did not violate the court's somewhat ambiguous 
order in limine and that he did not hold up any piece of paper to the jury when he asked 
the question (R. 177:6-8; Addendum D).2 The prosecutor also argued that defendant had 
failed to show prejudice where the court immediately gave the jury a curative instruction 
as well as a written instruction concerning objections and there was "overwhelming 
evidence of guilt in this case (R. 177:8-9; Addendum D). 
On rebuttal, defendant conceded that the trial court's order in limine did not 
absolutely exclude evidence concerning defendant's prior felonies but argued that "there 
still is the two questions that were inappropriate questions asked one after another" at the 
very end of defendant's cross-examination (R. 177:9; Addendum D). 
The trial court concluded that even if it was misconduct for the prosecutor to ask 
the question concerning defendant's felonious past, "the Court very clearly told the jury 
that that was an improper question; it wasn't answered. I don't see prejudice to grant a 
new trial" (R. 177:9-10). 
2Although defendant's trial was apparently videotaped, defendant has not included 
that tape in the record on appeal. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's claim that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor's single question 
concerning whether defendant had any prior felony convictions is without merit. 
Defendant immediately objected to the question. The trial court sustained that objection 
and immediately issued a curative instruction. In addition, written Jury Instruction 29 
instructed the jury not to speculate regarding the answers to questions to which objections 
were sustained. Finally, there was overwhelming evidence in this case of defendant's 
guilt. Thus, this Court should affirm defendant's conviction and the trial court's denial of 
his motion for new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL WHERE IT 
IMMEDIATELY SUSTAINED DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO 
THE PROSECUTOR'S UNANSWERED QUESTION AND ISSUED 
AN IMMEDIATE CURATIVE INSTRUCTION AND A LATER 
WRITTEN INSTRUCTION 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor's single unanswered question whether 
defendant had any prior felony convictions was prejudicial error requiring a new trial. 
Aplt. Br. at 12-21. Defendant contends that, because "the prosecutor had plain directions 
from the trial judge that the information concerning Zinnerman's alleged criminal record 
was inadmissible, it was improper for the prosecutor to allude to such matters." Aplt. Br. 
at 15. He further argues that the error was prejudicial because "the suggestion of a 
criminal background may have added critical weight to the prosecutor's case" where a 
12 
"pivotal issue[] concerned the identification of the second suspect" and resolution of that 
issue rested on the credibility of the detectives' testimony against that of defendant's. 
Aplt.Br.atl7, 19. 
To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant must establish that 
"the actions or remarks of. . . counsel call to the attention of 
the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in 
determining its verdict and, if s o , . . . under the circumstances 
of the particular case, [that] the error is substantial and 
prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in 
its absence, there would have been a more favorable result." 
State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35 \ 22, 392 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (quoting State v. Longshaw, 961 
P.2d 925, 928 (Utah App. 1998) (additional citations omitted)); see also State v. Hay, 859 
P.2d 1, 7 (Utah 1993). Here, however, this Court need not determine whether the 
prosecutor's conduct was improper because defendant has failed to demonstrate that the 
alleged error was "substantial and prejudicial." See State v. Stephens, 946 P.2d 734, 737 
(Utah App. 1997) (holding that court did not have to reach whether conduct was improper 
where defendant had failed to establish prejudice). 
Standard of review. Where the trial court has already ruled on a defendant's 
claim of prosecutorial misconduct, its ruling is reviewed "with deference 'because of the 
advantaged position of the trial judge to determine the impact of events occurring in the 
courtroom on the total proceedings.'" Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ^ | 20 (discussing standard of 
review of denial of motion for mistrial on claim of prosecutorial misconduct) (quoting 
State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1231 (Utah 1997)); see also Hay, 859 P.2d at 7; 
13 
Longshaw, 961 P.2d at 927); State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1352 (Utah App. 1997). 
"'[U]nless a review of the record shows that the court's decision is plainly wrong in that 
the incident so likely influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had a 
fair trial, [this Court] will not find that the court's decision was an abuse of discretion.'" 
Kohl, 2000 UT 35, \ 20 (quoting Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1231); see also State v. Harmon, 
956 P.2d 262, 274-75 (Utah 1998). In this case, the record clearly supports the trial 
court's decision. 
The law concerning prejudice in prosecutorial misconduct claims. Utah courts 
have consistently held that a defendant is not prejudiced by the improper disclosure of 
evidence where (1) such evidence is immediately stricken upon objection by defendant; 
(2) a curative instruction is immediately given; (3) no further reference is made to that 
evidence; (4) an additional instruction on the issue is included in the final written 
instructions given to the jury; and (5) the evidence against defendant is strong. See 
Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ffij 37-38, 994 P.2d 177 (holding that, although it was error for the 
prosecutor to inquire into the details of the defendant's prior conviction," the error "was 
harmless because the questioning was suspended before the defendant could provide 
details to prejudice the jury and the jury was given adequate instructions on two occasions 
to disregard the evidence"); State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah App. 1990) (holding 
that although jury "was in a position to speculate about whether [defendant] had . . . 
14 
committed [another] crime, the court's limiting instructions minimized the danger of such 
speculation to the point of being harmless"); see also Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ^ | 24; Harmon, 
956 P.2d at 274-75; Longshaw, 961 P.2d at 931; Stephens, 946 P.2d at 737-38; State v. 
Boyatt, 854 P.2d 550, 554-55 (Utah App. 1993). Cf State v. Saunders, 992 P.2d 951, 
960 (Utah 1999) (finding prejudice where trial court erroneously admitted evidence of 
defendant's alleged prior criminal conduct and prosecutor's closing argument was 
"replete with direct references to defendant's alleged [prior] conduct" (emphasis added); 
State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 403 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (holding that improper 
argument to which court overrules defendant's objections, is harmful "[w]hen the 
evidence in the record is circumstantial or sufficiently conflicting" (emphasis added)); 
State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1984) (holding that repeated improper questions 
and argument by prosecutor were prejudicial where evidence was not compelling); State 
v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146, 147 (Utah 1981) (holding that "continued attempts" by 
prosecutor to put defendant's silence before jury "could have affected the result and are 
therefore prejudicial" (emphasis added)); State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532, 536 (Utah App. 
1997) (holding that repeated reference to defendant's silence was prejudicial where trial 
court did not give immediate curative instruction and evidence against defendant was not 
overwhelming but rather rested on the credibility of defendant versus the credibility of the 
15 
key prosecution witness); State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293, 1297-98 (Utah App. 1997) 
(holding multiple references to defendant's silence were prejudicial where trial court 
gave neither curative instruction nor general instruction regarding defendant's right to 
silence); State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 350 (Utah App. 1993) (holding that six instances 
of prosecutorial misconduct occurring without objections or curative instructions were 
prejudicial: "While any one of these errors would in itself be harmless, their cumulative 
effect is not," especially where case turns on credibility of defendant versus credibility of 
his victim). 
This is particularly so where the challenged statement is a question from the 
prosecutor that goes unanswered. See Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ffl[ 37-38, 994 P.2d 177; State 
v. Jaynes, 464 S.E.2d 448, 467 (N.C. 1995) (holding no prejudice where trial court 
sustained objections to three improper questions and questions went unanswered); State v. 
Hartley, 414 S.E.2d 182, 186 (S.C. App. 1992) (holding no prejudice where prosecutor 
twice asked about prior criminal history but trial court sustained objections and defendant 
did not answer questions). 
Application of the law to this case. In light of the foregoing, defendant's claim 
fails. First, the conduct defendant challenges was an isolated event that occurred during 
cross-examination of defendant, who was the fifth of seven witnesses in the course of a 
two-day trial (R. 176:189-90; Addendum B). Although the prosecutor did ask defendant 
whether he had "previously been convicted of a felony," the question was not a leading 
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one—i.e., "You've been convicted of a prior felony, haven't you Mr. Zinnerman?"—nor 
did it specify any particular felony (R. 176:189-90; Addendum B). Cf. Elliott v. State, 984 
S.W.2d 362, 364-65 (Ark. 1998) (finding prejudice where State disclosed specific prior 
crimes in opening argument but distinguishing case from one in which State never 
specified what other offenses defendant had been convicted of and prejudice was not 
found); Ex parte Sparks, 730 So. 2d 113, 115-16 (finding prejudice where defendant "is 
questioned about having previously been convicted of the same offense for which he is 
then being tried"). 
Second, nothing in the record supports defendant's claims that the prosecutor 
intentionally violated the trial court's order in limine by asking the challenged question or 
that, when asking the question, the prosecutor simultaneously upheld a docket statement 
implying proof of prior convictions.3 
3Although the trial court specifically ordered that it was "not going to allow 
[defendant's misdemeanor convictions] to be brought up," its order concerning 
defendant's felony conviction was less clear: evidence of that conviction, the court ruled, 
"would only be admissible, I guess, if he gets up there and says he's never been convicted 
of a felony or something like that" (R. 175:35). The court did not specifically rule that 
the prosecutor could not "bring up" or ask defendant concerning any prior felony 
convictions. The prosecutor's misinterpretation of the trial court's order, then, did not 
constitute an intentional violation of that order. 
Defendant's claim that the prosecutor simultaneously held up a docket statement 
when he asked the question is equally troublesome. During argument on defendant's 
motion for new trial, the prosecutor challenged defendant's claim, noting that he had 
reviewed the videotape of the trial and "[t]he docket was never displayed in any manner 
to the jury" (R. 177:8). Defendant neither asked the trial court to make a finding on that 
issue, nor has he included the videotape in the record on appeal. See State v. Wetzel, 868 
P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993) ("Parties claiming error below and seeking appellate review have 
17 
Third, the prosecutor's question was immediately followed by an objection by 
defense counsel, which the trial court sustained before defendant could answer (R. 
176:189-90). As the supreme court noted in Harmon: 
There is rarely a case in which a trial judge is not called upon 
to affirm an attorney's objection and instruct the jury to 
disregard an improper question or an improper answer a 
witness has given.... If a trial judge could not correct errors 
as they occur, few trials would be successfully concluded. 
Moreover, our judicial system greatly relies upon the jury's 
integrity to uphold the jury oath, including its promise to 
follow all of the judge's instructions. 
Harmon, 956 P.2d at 271-72. 
Fourth, after the trial court issued a strong curative instruction, no further reference 
was made to defendant's criminal history (R. 176:189-90; Addendum B). In addition, 
written Jury Instruction 29 reiterated: "As to any question to which an objection was 
sustained, you must not conjecture as to what the answer might have been or as to the 
reason for the objection" (R. 123; Addendum C). 
Finally, the evidence against defendant was direct and compelling. Cf. Aplt. Br. at 
18 (suggesting evidence was only circumstantial). Four different police officers 
the duty and responsibility to support their allegations with an adequate record."); Call v. 
City of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Utah App. 1990) ("Thus, the appellant has the 
burden of providing the reviewing court with an adequate record on appeal to prove his 
allegations."). Absent an adequate record on appeal, the reviewing court will necessarily 
assume the regularity of the proceedings below. See Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 
(Utah 1989); State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 699 (Utah App. 1995). 
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identified defendant as one of the parties arrested on May 22 in connection with the 
undercover drug operation (R. 175:20-22; 175:116-119; 175:91; 176:197-98). All of 
these officers had spent at least a couple of hours working closely with defendant on that 
day-looking at his face, observing his demeanor, etc. (R. 175:39,42, 50, 62, 95, 120-21; 
R. 176:199). They all recalled what defendant was wearing that day (R 175:18, 55, 60, 
88, 114; R. 176:196). They all recalled the scar they had seen on his stomach that day (R. 
175:37-38, 119, 91; 176:197-98). None had any doubt that defendant was the man who 
they had stopped that day (R. 175:22, 95, 116; 176:199).4 
Contrasted with this testimony, defendant testified that he was not at Pioneer Park 
on May 22nd because he was too busy walking some nine of eleven miles to attend a 
family picnic that day-one that lasted three days over Memorial Day weekend but for 
some unexplained reason started on a Friday and ended on a Sunday (R. 176:168-73). 
See Boyatt, 854 P.2d at 554 (rejecting defendant's claim that jury's knowledge of prior 
conviction prejudiced him because his credibility was at issue where defendant's story of 
"being attacked by seven armed gang members and successfully fighting off the attack 
could appear implausible to the jury"). 
In addition, although there were supposedly thirty to forty people at defendant's 
family picnic, defendant called only one witness to corroborate his alibi and that witness 
4As these facts indicate, defendant's assertion on appeal that the detectives 
fabricated their stories and learned about defendant's physical appearance only after he 
was arrested in November, see Aplt. Br. at 19-20, is unfounded. 
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admitted at trial that he had two felony convictions involving dishonest conduct (R. 
176:206,220). 
Finally, defendant testified that he had known Rudy Martin for three or four years 
(R. 176:180-82, 186-87). Martin testified that he had only kaown defendant for one year 
(R. 176:203). Defendant testified that he had not talked with Martin about the case prior 
to trial (R. 176:180-82, 186-87). Martin testified that defendant had talked with him 
about the case prior to trial (R. 176:203). See Boyatt, 854 P.2d at 554 (rejecting 
defendant's claim that jury's knowledge of prior conviction prejudiced him because his 
credibility was at issue where defendant's testimony was inconsistent with other 
witnesses'). 
In this case, the trial court quickly minimized any potential harm caused by the 
prosecutor's isolated question by immediately sustaining defendant's objection and 
issuing a curative instruction, which was followed by a final written instruction. 
Furthermore, defendant's testimony, even without the prosecutor's question, gave the jury 
reason to doubt defendant's credibility. Finally, the evidence that defendant committed 
the crime was overwhelming. Thus, any error caused by the prosecutor's question is not 
so "substantial and prejudicial" that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, 
there would have been a more favorable result to defendant. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, fflj 37-
38; Peters, 796 P.2d at 712 (Utah App. 1990); Kohl, 2000 UT 35,124; Harmon, 956 
20 
P.2d at 274-75; Longshaw, 961 P.2d at 931; Stephens, 946 P.2d at 737-38; Boyatt, 854 
P.2d at 554-55. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, the State requests that the Court affirm the trial court's denial 
of defendant's motion for new trial and thereby affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED &_ May 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
c k ^ & Bbc^uJi 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on _/J- May 2000,1 caused to be mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid, two accurate copies of this BRIEF OF APPELLEE to Linda M. Jones and 
Deborah Kreeck Mendez, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 424 East 500 South, 
Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, Attorneys for Appellant. 
21 
BUJ^ -tj. /6luesU^lc 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
^ \ ^ ^s^c<\ O 
T&'Z a$i 
N THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CQURT.D.rT r n u R T 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE^'feP^i^^^p.^^ 
NOV 1 7 1999 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANTHONY ZINNERMAN, 
Defendant. 
By 
laaa»^ 
Case No. 981914830 
Volume I 
Trial 
Electronically Recorded on 
May 20, 1999 
BE FORE: THE HONORABLE L. A. DEVER 
Third District Court Judge 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
Michael Post.ma 
Asst. Dist. Attorney 
231 E. 400 S. 
#300 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-4105 
Deborah Kreeck-Mendez 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders 
424 E. 500 S. #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)532-5444 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe RPR/CSR/CCT 
1641 SOUTH 350 WEST 
OREM, UTAH 84058
 ?n[f, 
TELEPHONE: (801)225-0234 'u' ' '' m k 
ITS 
33 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: Is this (inaudible)? 
THE COURT: (inaudible) in court. The 
prosecutor is now back (inaudible). 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: Your Honor, I spent the 
lunch hour listening to these tapes again. What we 
have is on — we have what we heard this morning. We 
(inaudible) plea was not entered (inaudible) notice of 
pleading was not actually entered. What Judge Palmer 
did was set it for November 18th at 8 a.m. on Judge 
McClevefs domestic violence calendar. We heard that 
this morning. 
There appears to have not been a November 
18th hearing, there is no record of it in the docket, 
(inaudible) realize there's not a (inaudible) so that 
could have happened. 
On November 20th we have Judge McCleve and 
Judge McCleve starts this tape by saying, "Mr. 
Zinnerman, you have previously pled guilty for 
domestic violence before Judge Palmer." Anthony does 
not remember doing anything but going to another court 
hearing in between. I have spoken to Renee, who 
handled the case in this matter, and she indicated to 
me that if it is not on the docket, if it had 
happened, there's no way to prove it. 
I think my argument is twofold. One, in 
34 
light of this, the question — there is no recording 
of my client's plea at any time to a false 
information, and therefore we can't use it at this 
time against him. The judgement committment here 
actually says, "Charges battery and (inaudible) false 
information." It doesn't actually say pled guilty, 
the docket says that he pled guilty, but the docket 
also — but the tape recording clearly — that's 
(inaudible) on the 20th. 
The second part of my argument is there is 
not a judgment and conviction until sentencing is 
entered, and Judge McCleve clearly sentences him only 
on a battery. So therefore, my argument is that one, 
I don't believe it ever happened. We've heard what 
the State's intent was. I think that this is one of 
those screw-ups that happens when we're doing the 
misdemeanor calendars, and I don't think he ever 
really entered a plea to anything. He was without 
counsel, at both occasions it appears like he's 
without counsel and looks like counsel is appointed 
sometime later on in a violation in an order to show 
cause. 
THE COURT: Mr. Postma, what do you have to 
say? 
MR. POSTMA: Your Honor, if the recorded 
35 
record is in doubt, what we do have is the original 
document signed by Judge McCleve. I have the Court's 
signature, I have certification, and it indicates the 
defendant pled guilty to battery and false 
information. Just because it says charges, I don't 
think we're to presume that he was merely charged with 
that, it's on the sentence and judgment. 
In support of that, the docket says there 
were guilty pleas to both counts. I think the absence 
of the other record, the written record should 
control. 
THE COURT: I'm not going to allow it to be 
brought up. 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: Your Honor, the second 
question is as to his (inaudible) aggravated assault. 
Again, I think it's the same argument with Mr. Martin 
only it's a much stronger argument here, it only comes 
in as prejudice in this case. That's the only reason 
is to show character, it doesn't go to veracity, 
truthfulness or (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Well, it would only be 
admissible, I guess, if he gets up there and says he's 
never been convicted of a felony or something like 
that. 
Anything else? 
36 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: No, that's all, thank 
you. And I apologize for the confusion (inaudible). 
(Jury returns to courtroom) 
THE COURT: The record should indicate that 
the jury is seated in the jury box. The prosecution 
is present, the defendant and defense counsel are 
present. When we left, Detective Johnson was on the 
stand. You may resume the witness stand. 
MR. POSTMA: Your Honor, when we left the 
State had offered State's 1 and 2. For the record, 
were those received? 
THE COURT: They were received. 
Q. BY MR. POSTMA: Detective Johnson, when the 
defendant was searched, did you see any scars or any 
distinguishing marks at that time? 
A. I did, I seen a large scar on his stomach. 
Q. Can you describe that scar? 
A. It runs up and down, kind of got a little 
bit of a check on the bottom, like a checkmark kind 
of. 
Q. Was that the first time that you had seen 
that mark was when the defendant was searched? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why did this stand out in your mind? 
A, I think it stood out because initially on 
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ANTHONY ZINNERMAN 
having been first duly sworn, 
testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: 
Q. Anthony, can you state your name and spell it 
because we have some problems with names sometimes for 
the record. 
A, Anthony Zinnerman. A-n-t-h-o-n-y, 
Z-i-n-n-e-r-m-a-n. 
Q. Anthony, you've been listening to the 
evidence for the last day and a half now, and then I 
want to ask you some basic questions to start off. Have 
you met these officers before these last two days and 
before we had a preliminary hearing in February? 
A. No, I have not. 
Q. On May 22nd were you arrested or placed into 
custody? 
A. No, I wasn't. 
Q. On May 22nd did you go to jail? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. To the best of your recollection would you 
tell the jury what were you doing on May 22nd? 
A. As far as I can remember it was a day I had 
off, and there was this cookout that we had to attend 
189 
Q. And how many days did you go to the barbecue? 
A. I was there Friday, Saturday and Sunday, I 
reckon. For that Monday I don't reckon I went there, I 
don't believe I was there. I can't really (inaudible). 
Q. Now you know LaVon Brown, don't you? 
A. Excuse me? 
Q. You know LaVon Brown, don't you? 
A. Never heard of that name. 
Q. Never? 
A. Never. Well, I heard his name but I never 
knew him — in court, that's all. 
Q. You insist you were not in Pioneer Park on May 
22nd, in the Pioneer Park area on May 22nd of 1998; is 
that right? 
A. No, I wasn't. 
Q. You were never around 300 South and 300 West 
on May 22nd of 1998; is that right? 
A. Not on May 22nd, no, sir. 
Q. So in order for your story to be true, that 
would mean that Detective Johnson had to take the stand 
and lie, isn't it? 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: Your Honor, I object. A 
witness can not— 
THE WITNESS: I can answer that question. 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: A witness cannot comment 
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1 the State says that the facts are mischaracterized, 
2 but the facts are not. Clearly, the video, they are 
3 on a piece of paper picked up when the question was 
4 asked and held at the podium; not raised, not 
5 published to the jury but merely held. And that 
6 (Inaudible) an instruction, a mere impression, asking 
7 the question it gave an impression. The paper 
8 further substantiated the question that there must be 
9 something that the prosecutor is looking at. The 
10 Prosecutor's Memorandum said, "(Inaudible) 
11 question". Well, we've all been in court enough to 
12 know that the impression provided to the jury is that 
13 they were records. I think we further see that this 
14 is not just a mistake, but rather blatantly going 
15 over the Courts ruling because first we have a 
16 question - a question that was inappropriate. The 
17 first question the State asks is: "Was" - he asked 
18 Mr. Zinnerman to comment on another witness' 
19 credibility, and that he's clearly not allowed. And 
20 then he moved onto the next question, and says, "Do 
21 you have" --
22 THE COURT: We addressed that issue, 
23 didn't we? 
24 MS KREECK MENDEZ- We did. And you gave 
25 a curative instruction. But the coupling of two 
Page 2 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT Zinnerman? Okay. 
3 MS KREECK MENDEZ. Your Honor, did the 
4 Court receive copies of the transcript? 
5 THE COURT: I reviewed the material the 
6 parties have submitted. I had a Memorandum in 
7 Opposition to the Defendant's Motion for New Trial, 
8 and I have the Memorandum for New Trial that's filed 
9 by Defense. 
10 MS KREECK MENDEZ But no transcript? 
11 THE COURT: I have transcript that is in 
12 the back of the Memorandum in Opposition, looks like 
13 it is just a few sections of it. (Inaudible) is 
14 there something else? 
15 MS. KREECK MENDEZ: NO. Just SO the 
16 Court's file has them. 
17 Your Honor, our argument is simple, the 
18 Court ordered that the record would not be - the 
19 Court ordered they were not allowing to cite criminal 
20 record. We specifically talked about it, and you 
21 ordered it. First you said, "I'm not allowing it." 
22 Then later you said, "(Inaudible) of it." 
23 Your ruling does not allow (Inaudible). 
24 That's why we do a motion in limine. It is so 
25 prejudicial that even the mere mention of it. And 
Page 4 
1 inappropriate questions right at the end, right at 
2 the finale so overcame the testimony and the 
3 credibility of Mr. Zinnerman, which for the most part 
4 in this case, truly, was the crux of our defense, was 
5 his testimony. And to raise two inappropriate 
6 questions, one right after another, I think 
7 overwhelmed the credibility that we have here. 
8 So, I think the first prong, the Court 
9 ordered that it would not be addressed, it was 
10 addressed. And then it borders on misconduct because 
11 of the coupling of the two questions one right after 
12 another that the State should not have gone into. 
13 The Court clearly ordered - I don't think it 
14 (Inaudible). The Court said, "I will not allow it." 
15 And anyone who's practiced law knows that that's why 
16 we do these motions in limine, because a motion in 
17 limine is because we don't want to address it in the 
18 court. 
19 As to prejudice, this Court, in ruling 
20 that it is not allowed, has made the determination 
21 (Inaudible) 404, that the prejudice outweighs the 
22 probative value here. That decision was made. It is 
23 highly prejudicial for our case, and it is extremely 
24 prejudicial. So much so that the Court's curative 
25 instruction is not - it doesn't work. It doesn't 
BILLIE WAY, CCT 801-364-4943 Page 1 - Page 4 
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1 work for a jury. You cannot unring the bell. The 
2 jury had a visual impression with the piece of paper 
3 being held up and an audible question, both of them 
4 giving the impression to the jury there was something 
5 more. I had to object, but I hated to do it because 
6 I just reinforced it to the jury. But I had to 
7 preserve my record and have to let the Court know. 
8 The Court clearly said, "This isn't allowable." So 
9 we met the first prong, and the second prong of 
10 prejudice is clear. 
11 THE COURT: How can there be prejudice? 
12 There was not an answer to question. 
13 MS. KREECK MENDEZ: The prejudice is that 
14 an impression was delivered to the jury that there 
15 was something behind this question. And to even ask 
16 it — that's why the motion in limine. To even ask 
17 it is so prejudicial, it creates such an impression 
18 with the jury that it overcame anything else that 
19 Mr. Zinnerman said. It completely - it completely 
20 overcame what he said and his credibility and the 
21 records of his credibility. The jury knew something 
22 was up. I'm objecting, we are up at the bench 
23 arguing, they can see it and even the Court's 
24 curative instruction telling them to disregard it, 
25 that doesn't happen. Once you know something, once 
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1 you have heard something, you cannot undo it and they 
2 heard it. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 MR. POSTMA: Your Honor, I think we need 
5 to pay a little closer attention to the actual 
6 docket, and 1 have now provided the Court copies of 
7 Page 34 and 35 of the transcript, because I think 
8 there has been a mischaracterization even of the 
9 transcript. 
10 We argued whether the Defendant's 
11 misdemeanor convictions would be admissible in this 
12 case. We went back and forth on that for a little 
13 while, and the Court's response to that was, "I am 
14 not going to allow it to be brought up." Then 
15 Ms. Kreek Mendez talks about the felony convictions. 
16 I did not respond, and the Court ordered, "Well, it 
17 will only be admissible, I guess, if he gets up there 
18 and says he's never been convicted of a felony or 
19 something like that"; certainly not the affirmative 
20 statement previously when the Court had talked about 
21 the prior misdemeanor convictions. I did not cite 
22 that page in my Memorandum. I did cite the point on 
23 the video transcript. But that's where the actual 
24 language is. 
[25 I think that given the language that was 
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1 used in that order, there can certainly be some 
2 argument that the question could be asked. I think 
3 that the question in this case was asked in good 
4 faith, and so therefore there shouldn't be any 
5 misconduct. 
6 I think it's important to look at the 
7 question exactly as it was asked The question was: 
8 "Mr. Zmnerman, have you 
9 previously been convicted of a 
10 felony?"' 
11 It wais not a leading question. It was 
12 not accusing the Defendant of being convicted of a 
13 felony. It was merely an open-ended question, "Have 
14 you been convicted of a felony?" I stayed completely 
15 away from the Court's clear order of not getting into 
16 the misdemeanor convictions for false information; 
17 merely asking about the felony that I think was left 
18 open. 
19 As to having something at the podium when 
20 the question was asked, I reviewed the tape. I don't 
21 know what tape Miss Kreeck Mendez reviewed. But two 
22 to three questions prior to the time that the 
23 objectionable question was asked, I came to counsel 
24 table, two or three feet behind me, picked up the 
25 docket. It was not immediately prior to the time I 
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1 asked the Defendant that question. The docket was 
2 never displayed in any manner to the jury. And I 
3 would - and I think it is important to look at the 
4 exact language that the Defendant used. He indicates 
5 that the Stale held out a copy of the docket for the 
6 jury to see, and I think that's simply not the case, 
7 and I think that's highly prejudicial. 
8 If the Court does find that there was 
9 misconduct in this case, I think that there is 
10 certainly no prejudice. The Court immediately, after 
11 the question was asked, gave a curative instruction 
12 or a curative admonition to the jury that they were 
13 to disregard the question, just as the Court had done 
14 to the question before that. The Court also provided 
15 written instructions to the jury that instructed them 
16 they weren't to speculate on what the answers to 
17 those questions may have been. 
18 There hasn't been any discussion today, 
19 whatsoever, on the strength of the evidence that was 
20 presented to the jury. That's one factor that the 
21 Court is allowed to take into consideration, is the 
22 relative strength of the State's case in comparison 
23 to the objectionable conduct in this case. Here, we 
24 have one question that was not even answered by the 
25 Defendant, and you balance that in relation to, I 
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1 think, what is the overwhelming evidence of guilt in 
2 this case. I don't think there is prejudice, and 
3 there is no misconduct. 
4 THE COURT: Ms. Kreek Mendez. 
5 MS. KREECK MENDEZ: Your Honor, 
6 Mr. Postma is correct. I glanced at this just before 
7 he started arguing and I was ornery and tired. He 
8 did -- you said, "I'm not going to allow it regarding 
9 to misdemeanors." It did not go to the second 
10 question, you are right. But there still is the two 
11 questions that were inappropriate questions asked one 
12 right after another. The final words that 
13 (Inaudible) cross-examination. 
14 MR. POSTMA: Just briefly on that point, 
15 Your Honor: The first question that was asked, there 
16 was no motion in limine on that, that was not brought 
17 up ahead of time. The Defense objected to that 
18 question, the Court sustained the objection, Counsel 
19 moved on from there and asked the next question. 
20 THE COURT: In this matter I reviewed the 
21 (Inaudible) file (Inaudible) I (Inaudible) have clear 
22 recollection of this case. It may have been some 
23 misconduct to ask the question the way it was asked, 
24 but I believe (Inaudible) prejudice to the Defendant 
25 by the asking of the question. I believe the Court 
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1 very clearly told the jury that that was an improper 
2 question; it wasn't answered. I don't see prejudice 
3 to grant a new trial. The Motion to Grant a N e w 
4 Trial will be denied. 
5 MS. KREECK MENDEZ: Your Honor, may we 
6 have the State prepare an order to that? 
7 THE COURT: It is on the back here? The 
8 back? 
9 (Discussion off the record.) 
10 (Hearing adjourned.) 
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